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MEDICAL MALPRACTICE MEDIATION:
BENEFITS GAINED, OPPORTUNITIES
LOST
CAROL B. LIEBMAN*
I
INTRODUCTION
In the past decade, the United States healthcare system has begun to use
mediation to facilitate communication between patients and physicians after an
adverse medical event, to ease tensions among members of care-giving teams,1
to resolve medical malpractice claims,2 and to help family members and medical
professionals make awesome and wrenching decisions at the end of life.3
Implementation of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 will
produce new controversies and increase the need for mediation. Patients,
families, physicians, nurses, other healthcare professionals, and administrators
will require help managing the disagreements that arise as they adapt to the
altered healthcare system.
The Department of Health and Human Services understands this. The
Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality recently announced seven grants
as part of the Patient Safety and Medical Liability Initiative.4 Four grants,
totaling $10 million, went to programs focusing on the interactions among
patient safety goals, the litigation system, and physician–patient
communication.5 Intelligent use of mediation and mediation skills can help us
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achieve a safer and more efficient healthcare system. But for mediation’s
potential benefits to be obtained, government officials and healthcare
professionals must decide how conflict should be handled and what the role of
lawyers should be when difficult physician–patient communications are
required. The potential benefits from mediation are significant: improved
patient safety; teamwork; relationship repair; and financial savings for
physicians, hospitals, and patients. But achieving those benefits requires
understanding of what recent scholarship has reported about successful and
unsuccessful uses of mediation in the world of healthcare and sophisticated
training of healthcare professionals, so that they can make informed decisions
about when to use mediation and how to participate effectively in mediation.
This article will review two recent studies evaluating the use of interestbased mediation to resolve medical malpractice claims. The first studied cases
brought against the New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation (the
HHC study);6 the second, Mediating Suits against Hospitals (the MeSH study),
studied cases brought against private New York City hospitals.7 The article will
then consider how non-participation of physicians in mediations diminishes
opportunities to achieve noneconomic goals that plaintiffs desire.
II
SUMMARY OF THE HHC AND MESH STUDIES
A. Overview of the HHC and MeSH Studies
Both studies used an interest-based model of mediation to test whether
mediation of medical malpractice cases can lead to economic benefits for the
parties by reducing litigation costs and providing compensation sooner while
promoting the sort of discussion that contributes to improved patient safety and
repaired patient–physician relationships. The HHC study investigated
mediation of cases brought against the New York City Health and Hospital
Corporation.8 MeSH studied mediations of lawsuits against private hospitals in
the New York City area.9 In the HHC study, the Health and Hospitals
Corporation referred twenty-nine cases for mediation; in twenty-four cases, the
lawyers agreed to mediation and nineteen cases were actually mediated. In the
MeSH study, thirty-one cases, drawn from a pool of sixty-seven, referred

6. Chris Stern Hyman & Clyde B. Schecter, Mediating Medical Malpractice Suits Against
Hospitals: New York City’s Pilot Project, 25 HEALTH AFF. 1394 (2006).
7. Hyman, Liebman, Schecter & Sage, supra note 2, at 798.
8. Hyman & Schecter, supra note 6, at 1394.
9. Hyman, Liebman, Schecter & Sage, supra note 2, at 797–99. In both the MeSH and HHC
studies, the defendants made the decision about which cases to refer to mediation. They were not
explicit about their selection criteria.
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lawsuits involving eleven non-profit hospitals in New York City, were
mediated.10
B. Settlement Data
In the HHC study, 68.4% (thirteen of nineteen) of the cases settled through
mediation,11 while in the MeSH study, 70.6% (twenty-two of thirty-one) of the
cases were settled as a result of mediation.12 In the HHC study, initially only
cases with claims of $400,000 or below were selected for mediation. Halfway
through the study, that limit was removed. The mean HHC settlement amount
was $111,000 with a range of $17,500 to $400,000,13 while in the MeSH study,
settlements were higher with a mean of $250,000 and a range of $35,000 to
$1,700,000.14
C. Mediator Style
Both studies used co-mediators and an interest-based model of mediation.
A principle investigator co-mediated eighteen of the nineteen HHC
mediations,15 and one of the two principle investigators co-mediated all but
three of the MeSH cases.16 Because of the focus on the question of whether and
how mediation might contribute to patient safety and improved quality of care,
the other mediators in both studies were chosen for their comfort discussing
highly emotional issues and their skill in helping participants explore a broad
range of noneconomic issues. Mediation services were provided without charge
in both studies.
D. Party Participation
During pre-mediation conference calls with counsel, the mediators in the
MeSH study pointed out the potential value to clients—both physicians and
patients—of participation in the mediations. In the MeSH study, 80.6%

10. North Carolina medical malpractice mediations were the focus of a 1995 study which concluded
that the “mediations” were “nothing more than a structured, traditional settlement conference
conducted by a neutral third party.” The settlement rate in that study was 44.2% (eighty-seven of 197).
Thomas B. Metzloff, Ralph A. Peeples & Catherine T. Harris, Empirical Perspectives on Mediation and
Malpractice. 60 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 107, 151, 137 (Winter 1997). A second article examined
more of the 1995 North Carolina data regarding how the forty-six directly observed mediations were
conducted. Ralph A. Peeples, Catherine. T. Harris & Thomas B. Metzloff, Following the Script: An
Empirical Analysis of Court-Ordered Mediation of Medical Malpractice Cases, 2007 J. DISP. RESOL. 101
(2007).
11. Hyman & Schecter, supra note 6, at 1395.
12. Hyman, Liebman, Schecter & Sage, supra note 2, at 807. In the MeSH study, sixteen cases
settled at mediation (sixty-eight percent), another five settled afterward at amounts discussed during
the mediation, and three cases settled after the mediation had been scheduled but before it took place.
13. Initially, only cases with claims of $400,000 or below were sent to mediation in the HHC study.
Midway through the study, that cap was lifted. Hyman & Schecter, supra note 6, at 1395.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Hyman, Liebman, Schecter & Sage, supra note 2, at 806.
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(twenty-five of thirty-one) of the plaintiffs attended the mediations,17 but not a
single physician attended. In the HHC study, it was known from the outset that
physicians would not participate. In that study, 84% (sixteen of nineteen) of the
plaintiffs attended the mediations.18
E. Participants’ Assessment of the Mediations
Most of the plaintiffs who attended the mediations in both studies found it a
positive experience.19 Using a five-point scale with a score of one being the most
positive, MeSH plaintiffs rated the mediation process and their experience
during the actual mediation at a mean of 1.98,20 while the HHC plaintiffs gave
mediation a mean rating of 2.22.21 Attorneys also rated their experience in the
mediations positively. For many, this was their first experience with interestbased mediation.22 Unlike the plaintiff participants, many MeSH attorneys
(eighty percent of the defense lawyers and forty-two percent of the plaintiffs’
attorneys) had previous experience in mediation.23 They gave their MeSH
experience a mean score of 1.9.24 In the HHC study, the City was represented by
a single attorney who had not previously participated in a mediation; her
positive experience is reported in an article in the New York Law Journal.25 The
HHC study lawyers gave the mediation process a mean rating of 1.95 and rated
the results of the mediation at 2.56.26
A few of the MeSH lawyers would have preferred an evaluative approach to
mediation. Five of nineteen plaintiff’s lawyers and three of sixteen defense
lawyers were critical of the mediators’ non-evaluative approach,27 and one felt
the process was inefficient because of the amount of time the plaintiff was
allowed to speak.28
As Hyman et al. report, in the MeSH study,

17. Id. at 807.
18. Hyman & Schecter, supra note 6, at 1397.
19. Hyman, Liebman, Schecter & Sage, supra note 2, at 802–03. In the MeSH study, research
assistants asked all participants in post-mediation telephone interviews questions designed to measure
their satisfaction with the mediation process.
20. Id.
21. Hyman & Schecter, supra note 6, at 1397. For a detailed analysis of party response to eight
questions in a post-mediation interview that measured their attitudes toward the mediation process, see
Hyman, Liebman, Schecter & Sage, supra note 2, at 803–04.
22. See Hyman, Liebman, Schecter & Sage, supra note 2, at 818.
23. Id.
24. In twenty cases, either an insurance representative or a hospital representative also attended
the mediation. They rated their experience at a mean of 2.5 with no significant difference between the
two groups. Six relatives of the plaintiffs also attended the mediation. Id. at 809–10.
25. Amy G. London, Mediation Offers Promise, But No Cure for System’s Ills, N.Y. L.J., Feb. 16,
2006.
26. Hyman & Schecter, supra note 6, at 1396.
27. Hyman, Liebman, Schecter & Sage, supra note 2, at 818–19.
28. Id. at 815.
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Attorneys, especially on the defense side, showed some reluctance to try mediation
despite the considerable financial benefit to their clients of avoiding or limiting trial
preparation and trial. In theory, decisions about whether or not to mediate should be
made jointly by lawyers and clients (ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct
2006). As a practical matter, attorneys act as gatekeepers, either making on their own
the decision whether to mediate and whether clients will attend and participate or
29
heavily influencing clients’ choices.

F. Time Savings
Both studies found that mediation was time-efficient. In the HHC study,
lawyers estimated that they spent approximately one-tenth as much time
preparing for mediation as for litigation.30 In the MeSH study, lawyers reported
three to ten hours of preparation for mediation (median six hours), contrasted
with estimates of 100 hours that would be needed for trial preparation.31
G. Discovery
While discovery was completed in ten of twenty MeSH cases and partially
completed in eight others, there was no correlation between the stage in
litigation and the likelihood of settlement.32 Seventy percent of the cases where
discovery had been completed settled at mediation and seventy-five percent of
those with partial discovery settled.33
III
BENEFITS GAINED
The MeSH and HHC studies show that mediation can save transaction
costs, give plaintiffs the opportunity to be heard, and allow defendants to obtain
information that might improve the quality of care. But the decision not to have
physicians participate in the mediation minimized the last benefit. While the
overwhelming majority of cases settle before trial,34 most do so late in the
litigation process, on the proverbial courthouse steps. If parties make increased
use of mediation to reach settlement closer in time to the adverse event,
defendants will realize significant savings in litigation costs, plaintiffs will
receive compensation sooner and when they may need it most, and plaintiffs’
lawyers will still receive adequate compensation for their work. As argued in
previous articles,
While risk managers and lawyers need to gather information in order to value a
malpractice claim, the amount of information needed to guide a settlement
negotiation is not as great as the amount required to prove a case at trial. Early

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Id. at 813.
Hyman & Schecter, supra note 6, at 1394.
Hyman, Liebman, Schecter & Sage, supra note 2, at 812–13.
Id. at 809.
Id. at 812.
Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: What the Numbers Tell Us, What They May Mean, DISP.
RESOL. MAG., Summer 2004, at 3.
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mediation offers the opportunity for patients to receive compensation soon after the
event and for defendants (and to a lesser extent plaintiffs) to avoid the financial costs
of prolonged discovery. Early settlement also spares patients and physicians a brutal
and emotionally draining discovery process. In addition, when there is only a short gap
in time between the harm and the mediation, information that might suggest a need
for changed procedures is more likely to seem salient and lead to improved patient
35
safety.

Of course, early mediation will not always be appropriate. Sometimes it
takes time for the long-term consequences of an injury to be clear. In other
cases where defendants are certain that care was appropriate, they may not be
willing to make an offer. Even in those cases, both sides may benefit from
giving the plaintiffs the opportunity to be heard and explaining to the
defendants what happened and why, especially if communication between the
caregivers and the patient or patient’s family has been poor. Finally, early
mediation may not be appropriate when there is a suspicion of a cover-up.
Participants in the MeSH study reported some noneconomic benefits as
well: the opportunity for a relative to speak about what had happened (the
mother of a child with Erb’s palsy),36 for the plaintiff to tell her story in a
professional setting (a defense lawyer commenting on mediation of case
brought by a breast cancer surgery patient who suffered complications from
intravenous (IV) chemotherapy infusion),37 and for a plaintiff to understand the
other side’s perspective on the case (plaintiff’s lawyer discussing the impact of
mediation in a contaminated platelets wrongful death action).38 In addition, in
the MeSH study, in four instances, hospital representatives reported they had
obtained information from the mediation that might lead them to suggest
changes in policy.39
IV
OPPORTUNITIES LOST
While twenty-five plaintiffs participated in the thirty-one MeSH mediations,
and sixteen in the nineteen HHC mediations, not a single physician took part.40
When defendant physicians do not participate in mediations, those physicians,
the defendant hospitals, the plaintiff patients and families, and the general
population of patients all lose. Non-participation of defendant physicians leads
to a loss of the opportunity for patients and physicians to reconcile, loss of the
opportunity for the physician to be forgiven and for the patient or family to
forgive, loss of the opportunity for the physician and family members to forgive
themselves, loss of the opportunity for information giving and gathering, and
loss of the opportunity to consider changes in institutional policies and
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Hyman, Liebman, Schecter & Sage, supra note 2, at 813.
Id. at 811.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 823.
Id. at 807; Hyman & Schecter, supra note 6, at 1396.

LIEBMAN

Summer 2011]

4/6/2011

MEDICAL MALPRACTICE MEDIATION

141

practices. When physicians are not included in the mediation, they are also
deprived of “voice, representation and participation,” key elements in what
procedural-justice scholars have identified as critical to a process being
perceived as fair.41
There is a known mismatch between what patients and families want
following a medical error and the way physicians communicate after such
events. Patients and family members want to receive a detailed explanation of
what happened and why it happened, want to know how the problem will be
corrected and future errors prevented, and want to receive an apology.42 They
also want reassurance about the medical and, ultimately, financial
consequences.43 These findings about patient and family goals after an adverse
medical event are consistent with procedural-justice research, which finds that
litigants are often after more than winning or losing or money, instead
evaluating their experience in the courts in terms of criteria such as
“vindication, attention, accountability, information, accuracy, comfort, respect,
recognition, dignity, efficacy, empowerment, [and] justice.”44
However, “when unexpected clinical outcomes occur . . . [p]hysicians
frequently avoid conversations with the patient and patient’s family about what
occurred, rarely apologize or explain the steps that will be taken to prevent
recurrence of the harm, and vary widely in the type and amount of information
they disclose.”45 And while there is a clear trend toward greater disclosure as a
matter of ethics, institutional policy, and regulation,46 other studies show that
implementing new policies is difficult and actual rates of disclosure remain low.
Another equally troubling mismatch is that between attorneys’ perceptions
of their clients’ goals in medical malpractice litigation and the goals actually
reported by plaintiffs. An important and insufficiently noted work by Tamara
Relis47 found that lawyers for both defendants and plaintiffs believe that

41. Nourit Zimerman & Tom R. Tyler, Between Access to Counsel and Access to Justice: A
Psychological Perspective, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 473, 486 (2010); see also id. at 486 n.38.
42. Thomas H. Gallagher et al., Choosing Your Words Carefully: How Physicians Would Disclose
Harmful Medical Errors to Patients, 166 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1585, 1585–93 (2006).
43. Id.
44. Zimerman & Tyler, supra note 41, at 482 (quoting Judith Resnik et al., Individuals Within the
Aggregate: Relationships, Representations, and Fees, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 296, 364 (1996)).
45. Hyman, Liebman, Schecter & Sage, supra note 2, at 800 (citing Lauris C. Kaldjian et al.,
Disclosing Medical Errors to Patients: Attitudes and Practices of Physicians and Trainees, 22 J.
INTERNAL MED. 988 (2007); Rae M. Lamb et al., Hospital Disclosure Practices: Results of a National
Survey, 22 HEALTH AFF. 73 (2003); Gallagher et al., supra note 42).
46. Joint Comm’n on Accreditation of Healthcare Org., Ethics, Rights, and Responsibilities, in
COMPREHENSIVE ACCREDITATION MANUAL FOR HOSPITALS: THE OFFICIAL HANDBOOK (2003),
Standard RI.1.2.2, [which went into effect on July 1, 2001]; AMA COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND
JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS: CURRENT OPINIONS WITH ANNOTATIONS § 8.12
(1994); DOUG WOJCIESZAK ET AL., SORRY WORKS! DISCLOSURE, APOLOGY, AND RELATIONSHIPS
PREVENT MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CLAIMS (2007).
47. TAMARA RELIS, PERCEPTIONS IN LITIGATION AND MEDIATION: LAWYERS, DEFENDANTS,
PLAINTIFFS, AND GENDERED PARTIES (2009). Relis gathered data through 131 interviews,
observations, and questionnaires of participants in sixty-four Canadian “fatality and medical injury
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plaintiffs are primarily after money when they sue. Ninety percent of the
physicians’ lawyers thought that money was a plaintiff’s sole goal, while only ten
percent recognized plaintiffs’ desires for answers.48 Relis found that hospital
lawyers also saw money as plaintiffs’ primary goal (67%) but did recognize
other interests including: (1) obtaining answers (25%), (2) acknowledgment of
harm (25%), (3) either vindication or justice (17%), (4) blame (17%), and (5)
prevention of reoccurrence (8%).49 Eight percent of the hospital lawyers
thought money was only a secondary goal.50 Plaintiffs’ lawyers’ views had more
in common with the views of other lawyers than with those of their clients.
Sixty-seven percent (the same percent as hospital lawyers) thought the primary
goal of plaintiffs was to obtain money,51 but they also recognized other goals: (1)
obtaining answers (50%), (2) retribution (33%), (3) acknowledgment of harm
(28%), (4) accepting responsibility (17%), (5) apology (17%), (6) to be sure the
harm never happens again (6%), and (7) either revenge or punishment (6%).52
Twenty-two percent of the plaintiffs’ lawyers saw money as a secondary goal of
their clients.
Plaintiffs in the Relis study tell a very different story. For them, it is
principles that matter and not money.53 Plaintiffs reported that their primary
goal in suing was to get an admission of fault or responsibility (59%). An
additional 59% sued to ensure that the harm never occurred again. Fifty-three
percent sought answers, 41% retribution, and 41% apology. Thirty-five percent
named money as a secondary goal, 35% wanted an acknowledgement of harm,
and 24% sought punishment. Only 18% stated that money was their primary
goal and a mere 6% stated that money was their only goal.54 Forty-one percent
did not mention money as a goal.55
Relis explains these results as follows:
[I]n assisting disputants to understand their cases and what can be done about them,
lawyers as gatekeepers to legal institutions virtually always transform disputes. . . .
[L]itigants’ experiences and extralegal aims are translated, reconstituted, and coerced

cases,” the equivalent to medical malpractice cases in the United States. Even though, by law,
defendants were required to be present for the mediation, they usually were not. The requirement was
avoided by having the lawyers, the plaintiff (if present), and the mediator agree to go forward without
the participation of the defendant. Id. at 87. In the sample, the defendant physicians rarely attended a
mediation. While the Canadian healthcare and tort systems differ in significant ways from those in the
United States—including a single payer healthcare system, court-imposed limits on some categories of
damages, provincial government reimbursement of part of physicians’ malpractice insurance payments,
a single rate for insurance regardless of physician specialty, and an aggressive approach to defense of
claims by CMPA—her data is nonetheless instructive.
48. Id. at 37 fig.1.
49. Id. at 38 fig.2.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 40.
52. Id. at 40 fig.3.
53. Id. at 42.
54. Id. at 43 fig.4.
55. Id.
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by lawyers to fit into legal and monetary compartments, ignoring aspects deemed
56
irrelevant in law and ultimately translating them into money.

Relis identifies four reasons for the differences in plaintiff and lawyer
identification of plaintiffs’ goals:
1. Lawyers focus on money damages because they are trained “to
operate according to rights and rules, applying law to facts and
placing people and occurrences into legal categories including
57
damages.”
2. In response to the legal system’s limited ability to deal with human
and emotional needs, lawyers react to what Relis calls “system
conditioning,” redefining and lowering their expectations for what
58
they can expect the legal system to offer their clients.
3. In the process of translating and transforming their clients’
litigation goals, plaintiffs’ lawyers may also be reinforcing their own
59
limited views of those goals.
4. As a result of translating and transforming goals in communication
with their clients, plaintiffs’ lawyers reinforce their own views and
may, as a result, stress only limited economic goals in discussions
with defense counsel. Since the defense side only communicates
indirectly with the plaintiff through their lawyers, they never hear
60
about any other goals.
In the MeSH study, lawyers explained their decisions not to bring physicians
to the mediation by pointing to their clients’ busy schedules or saying that they
wanted to avoid having their clients hear plaintiffs’ attacks or that it was not the
usual practice.61 The Relis study also found that lawyers sought to avoid
emotional confrontations by mediating without their clients. Those lawyers also
felt—consistent with their view that the litigation was only about money—that
physicians were not needed at the mediation and that their presence would not
aid in settlement since insurance companies, and not the physicians, make the
final decision about settlement amounts.
Some of the lawyers in the Relis study did see unfocused potential gains
from having defendant physicians participate.62 Forty-four percent of the
physicians’ lawyers said that physician participation might be helpful to
plaintiffs and sixty-seven percent thought their clients would benefit personally
and that the nonfinancial issues were important to their clients. Even so, they

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Id. at 53 (see n.18 for sources cited).
Id. at 62.
Id. at 62–63. Relis calls this “dispute translation.”
Id.
Id.
Hyman, Liebman, Schecter & Sage, supra note 2, at 817.
RELIS, supra note 47, at 93.
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did not bring their physician clients to mediation. Perhaps, as Relis notes, these
decisions resulted from the defense lawyers’ view of the physician’s irrelevance
to settlement, with only twenty-two percent thinking that having the doctors at
the mediation table would help settlement.63 Plaintiffs’ lawyers tended to have
views similar to those of the defense lawyers: they recognized the importance of
noneconomic issues to the clients, but, on the whole, also saw the defendants’
presence as irrelevant since the physicians were not involved in the monetary
decisions. It is possible that some lawyers feared that the defendant physicians’
anger and upset feeling at being sued or lack of communication skills might lead
to unproductive discussions during the mediation. Although, in most cases,
mediators, through process management, coaching, and modeling are able to
guide participant communication in a productive direction, occasionally,
aggressive or offensive behavior by a mediation participant can either decrease
the likelihood of settlement or drive up settlement costs. In the MeSH study,
lawyers “did not seem to consider the physicians’ own emotional needs after a
patient has been harmed by medical care and the possibility that participation
might have been helpful to a physician coping with feelings of guilt or
remorse.”64 In dramatic contrast with the responses of all of the attorney groups,
100% of the seventeen plaintiffs and twelve defendant physicians interviewed in
the Relis study said that the doctors should attend the mediation. The
physicians recognized the value of attendance to the doctor, to the plaintiff, and
for learning information that can contribute to improving the quality of care.65
In Relis’s plaintiff group, 76% thought attendance would be beneficial for the
physicians, 94% for the plaintiffs, and 53% for learning. Twenty-nine percent of
the plaintiffs and 64% of the defendant physicians thought physician presence
would aid in settlement.66 In the MeSH study, twenty-five percent of the
plaintiffs mentioned their frustration at the lack of communication with their
physicians after the event,67 a problem that could have been remedied had the
physicians attended the mediation.
The views of mediators in the Relis study were consistent with the desires of
the parties. Most of the mediators in her study thought that the nonparticipation of the defendant physicians made it more difficult to settle.68
The quest of patients and, moreso, of surviving family members for answers
to their questions about what happened to their loved ones is well and often

63. Id. at 95.
64. Hyman, Liebman, Schecter & Sage, supra note 2, at 817 (citing Michael Rowe, Doctors’
Responses to Medical Errors, 52 CRITICAL REVIEWS IN ONCOLOGY/HEMOTOLOGY 147 (2004); Albert
W. Wu et al., To Tell the Truth: Ethical and Practical Issues in Disclosing Medical Mistakes to Patients,
12 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 770 (1997)).
65. RELIS, supra note 47, at 104–09.
66. Id. at 105 fig.11.
67. Hyman, Liebman, Schecter & Sage, supra note 2, at 820.
68. RELIS, supra note 47, at 94 fig.9.
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painfully documented.69 In mediation, patients and their families may finally
obtain the information they have been seeking. Moreover, if a physician or
other clinician participates, he or she might provide a comprehensive
explanation of complex and uncertain medical situations rather than the often
fragmented communication that too often occurs in a hospital where a number
of busy nurses and physicians and other clinicians may be involved in a given
case with each assuming the others have taken time to communicate with the
patient or family.70
Without a physician or other person responsible for, and knowledgeable
about, patient care at the table, mediation will not lead to improved quality of
care because information with clinical significance may be overlooked or given
too little attention. For patient safety to benefit, someone is needed at the table
who has technical clinical knowledge, appreciation for the institution’s
culture—who are the power players, who makes decisions and has influence—
and who has an understanding of policy and procedures.
In a number of mediations, it has been clear that, especially after a death,
family members blame themselves for not doing more—not asking more
questions, not getting their loved one to the hospital sooner, not spending more
time at the bedside.71 The traditional adversarial defense of claims only
heightens their guilt and their grief. Information and, when appropriate,
assumption of responsibility for error by the medical team can provide release
for family members and allow them to forgive themselves for failing to prevent
a tragic outcome.
In one MeSH mediation, the behavior of the defense lawyer damaged the
possibility of settlement, may have increased the costs of settlement, and was
perceived by the plaintiff as an additional offense. His failure to adopt behavior
appropriate to mediation and his aggressive approach led the plaintiff’s lawyer
to label his decision to have his client attend as “a foolish mistake. I should not
have put my clients through that. . . . [T]he defense lawyers lacked any
sympathy, were abusive, and said things that are now torturing my clients.”72
Other opportunities to satisfy plaintiffs’ goals were missed when defense
attorneys in two MeSH cases identified changes in procedures that might help
69. See, e.g., NANCY BERLINGER, AFTER HARM: MEDICAL ERROR AND THE ETHICS OF
FORGIVENESS, (2005); SANDRA M. GILBERT, WRONGFUL DEATH: A MEDICAL TRAGEDY (1997);
Richard B. Hovery, Mitchell L. Dvorak, Tessa Burton, Sherry Worsham, James Padilla, Martin J.
Hatlie & Angela C. Morck, Patient Safety: A Consumer’s Perspective, QUALITATIVE HEALTH
RESEARCH (Feb. 22, 2011), http://qhr.sagepub.com/content/early/2011/02/18/1049732311399779.long,
DOI: 10.1177/1049732311399779.
70. In some settings, it is not unusual to have only lawyers or lawyers and insurance representatives
attend mediations without ether plaintiffs or defendants. For the reasons discussed in this article, nonparticipation of the defendant physicians in medical malpractice cases is especially counterproductive.
71. See, e.g., the case of Mr. D. in CAROL B. LIEBMAN & CHRIS STERN HYMAN, MEDICAL ERROR
DISCLOSURE, MEDIATION SKILLS, AND MALPRACTICE LITIGATION: A DEMONSTRATION PROJECT
IN PENNSYLVANIA 64–65 (2005), available at http://www.law.columbia.edu/null?exclusive=filemgr.
download&id=12462.
72. Hyman, Liebman, Schecter & Sage, supra note 2, at 816.
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avoid repetition of the harm. They chose not to share that information with the
plaintiffs, thus frustrating one of the goals that plaintiffs often cite: avoiding the
same harm happening to other patients. In some cases, the lawyers were
apparently not oriented toward those sorts of concerns. In four cases, mediators
identified changes in practices that might prevent future harm which were not
identified by the lawyers for either side.73
Several recent articles have explored the possible negative impact of lawyers
in mediation. Poitras et al.,74 in an empirical study, examined seven ways in
which attorney participation in mediation might have a negative impact on: (1)
settlement rates, (2) the length of time spent in mediation, (3) the parties’ view
of mediator effectiveness, (4) the clients’ view of whether the mediation was
fair, (5) the clients’ satisfaction with a mediated agreement, (6) parties’ trust
that the other side will abide by the mediation agreement, and (7) party
reconciliation. They found that attorney participation had no impact on the
settlement rate, minimal impact on the amount of time spent in mediation (on
average, mediations lasted thirty minutes longer when attorneys participated),
and no difference in parties’ view of mediation fairness, party satisfaction with
the agreement, or parties’ belief that the agreement would be followed. The
areas in which attorney participation did make a difference were the parties’
evaluation of mediator helpfulness and whether or not parties reconciled. The
authors speculated that the negative impact of attorney presence on
reconciliation may be the result of lawyers’ tendencies to focus on legal rather
than interpersonal matters, to advise their clients not to apologize, and to
substitute their voice for that of their clients by speaking for their clients.75
The authors suggest several strategies to control the negative impact of
lawyers on reconciliation between the parties. These include: (1) spending more
time prior to the mediation educating the attorneys about the process and how
to use it effectively76 (an attempt that was not particularly successful in the
MeSH study77), (2) specifically stating in mediation agreements that apologies or
statements of regret that an event occurred will be protected78 (some literature

73. Id. at 810.
74. Jean Poitras, Arnaud Stimec & Jean-François Roberge, The Negative Impact of Attorneys on
Mediation Outcomes: A Myth or a Reality?, 26 NEGOTIATION J. 9 (2010); see also Roselle L. Wissler,
Representation in Mediation: What We Know from Empirical Research, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 419
(2010). The authors found that, while lawyer presence does not appear to increase conflict in
mediation—or interfere with discussions of feelings or exploration of settlement options—lawyer
presence does appear to decrease party satisfaction with their own level of participation as well as
parties’ learning about the other side’s concerns. They also found that attorney presence correlated
with a lower rate of settlement.
75. Poitras, Stimec & Roberge, supra note 74, at 10.
76. Id. at 20.
77. Hyman, Liebman, Schecter & Sage, supra note 2, at 802.
78. Poitras, Stimec & Roberge, supra note 74, at 14.
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suggests that apologies which receive this type of protection have less value),79
and (3) encouraging the parties to speak to each other directly.80
It seems clear that the nonparticipation of physicians in the mediation
destroys any chance for patients and physicians to reconcile. It also deprives
patients of the opportunity to know that the physician involved cares enough
about the bad outcome to come and sit with the patient or family in the
mediation. Patients interpret nonparticipation as an indication of indifference,
lack of respect, and shirking of responsibility.
In one MeSH case for wrongful death,81 a patient was admitted to the
hospital with multiple co-morbidities, developed sepsis (system wide infection),
and remained in the hospital for six months steadily wasting away despite the
efforts of the medical team. She died two weeks after being transferred by the
family to another hospital. The story that the plaintiffs’ lawyers had
developed—their theory of the case—was that the defendant hospital had
neglected the patient and, in the words of the plaintiff’s daughter and her
lawyer, “allowed her to starve to death.”82 The hospital was represented by its
lawyer. No physician or other representative of the hospital attended the
mediation. In the course of the discussion, an alternative version of the story
became apparent to the mediators—that the hospital had continued to fight for
the patient and against her diseases for an extraordinarily long period and,
despite this fight, it was the disease that ultimately killed her. The mediators
raised this possible alternative narrative and it seemed to give some relief to the
daughter. Imagine how much more credible and comforting it would have been
to have a physician at the table to describe the fight, the complexities and
difficulties of this case, the frustration of seeing treatment after treatment fail,
and the healthcare team members’ sadness at the death of the patient. In
addition, the physician might have heard from the daughter about ineffective
communication with the family—a breakdown that ultimately led to total lack
of trust and the transfer.83
It is unfortunate, but understandable, that physicians do not act on their
realization of the potential benefit of their participation in mediation. One
reason is obvious—most people are conflict-averse and try to avoid difficult
conversations. With lawyers discouraging mediation participation, physicians
are happy to have a reason to avoid a difficult discussion. Jay Hoecker,
discussing the underrepresentation of physicians at a conference on Alternative

79. Aaron Lazare, Apology in Medical Practice: An Emerging Clinical Skill, 296 J. AM. MED.
ASS’N 1401 (2006) (citing Lee Taft, Apology and Medical Mistakes: Opportunity or Foil?, 14 ANNALS
HEALTH L. 55 (2005); Lee Taft, Apology Subverted: The Commodification of Apology, 109 YALE L.J.
1135 (2000)).
80. Poitras, Stimec & Roberge, supra note 74, at 14.
81. Hyman, Liebman, Schecter & Sage, supra note 2, at 801.
82. Author’s notes from a MeSH mediation.
83. Id.
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Dispute Resolution (ADR),84 points out that physicians are scientists and
scientists base action on data.85 The studies of medical malpractice mediation
discussed above are beginning attempts to provide data about the efficacy of an
approach different from the deny-and-defend tradition that will lead to
increased physician participation. Hoecker also argues that employer
institutions are more likely than individual physicians to accept the use of
ADR86 for so long as those processes are seen as an extension of the legal
system rather than integral to quality patient care.87 However, discussions with
individual physicians frustrated by instructions from their insurers to take an
adversarial, non-communicative approach toward their patients suggest that,
with a bit of organizing, a change might come just as easily from the ground up
as from the top down.
V
CONCLUSION
Lawyers discourage their physician clients from participation in mediation
for a number of reasons. First, they may be trying to protect their clients from
what certainly would be an emotionally trying, even if ultimately satisfying,
experience. Second, they see mediation as part of the legal system and, lacking
knowledge and understanding of the full range of benefits of mediation, have a
constricted vision of what is possible or productive in mediation. Third, their
experience with evaluative mediators may have blinded them to the
noneconomic benefits for their clients of client participation. Fourth, they may
fear either that their clients might say something that damages the legal case or
that offends the plaintiffs. Finally, given the fact that most defense counsel are
paid on an hourly basis, some may be hostile to a process that offers less
expensive resolution.
Sending a litigator to settle a case may make as much sense as asking a
surgeon to provide holistic noninvasive medical care. Litigators, whose advice
about communication with patients and their families and approach to client
participation in mediation seems so flawed, may only be doing their job—that
is, shaping all client interactions with the opposing side with an eye to the
impact on the legal case. Of course, this is a narrow definition of the lawyer’s
job and typifies the often criticized defend and deny mentality—most recently
seen in the British Petroleum disaster and Toyota malfunction—which fosters
mistrust. Toyota was widely criticized for its decision to withhold information
about possible problems with the gas pedal. Former Merrill Lynch media
relations executive, Eddie Reeves, said of that response, “People are

84. Jay L. Hoecker, Guess Who Is Not Coming to Dinner: Where Are the Physicians at the
Healthcare Mediation Table?, 29 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 249, 249 (2008).
85. Id. at 254–55.
86. Id. at 256.
87. Id. at 257.
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reasonable. They know companies make mistakes, and people will forgive an
honest mistake. They will not forgive a dishonest cover-up.”88
In both law and medicine, people turn to educated and trained professionals
for help with problems—often serious problems. Also, in both law and
medicine, individuals are dependent on institutions—hospitals and courts—with
their own traditions, cultures, and hierarchies. Beginning with the antipaternalistic patients’ rights movement of the 1960s, patients have become more
involved in their own care (even if at times producing a suspicious vigilance not
always good for a patient’s mental state or the physician–patient relationship).
Patient involvement has been increased by readily available medical
information on the internet.
Interestingly, there is no similar movement in law, except perhaps recently
among high-end consumers of legal services where post-recession attitudes
about how much clients are willing to pay and for what may be changing. The
difference in the development of patients’ active, questioning approach to
healthcare and the passive approach of many defendant physicians may result
from the fact that most malpractice clients are single or only few-time players
compared to patients who are regular and, in many cases, constant consumers
of medical care. Medical malpractice plaintiffs are unlikely to be involved in
repeat litigation, so they are less likely to understand the system well enough to
insist to their lawyers that the mediation not proceed without physician
participation. But many defendant healthcare institutions—hospitals, nursing
homes, and group practices—are repeat players. It is interesting to think about
ways that those defendants might learn from the patients’ rights movement in
their selection of, instructions to, and collaboration with their lawyers.

88. Peter S. Goodman, In Case of Emergency: What Not To Do, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 2010, at
BU1.

